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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING
ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
 PETER ASAAD: I’d like to welcome everyone to this informative program 
entitled E-Verify and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.1 I’d like also to thank 
our panelists for volunteering their time today and we would like to extend 
our appreciation to American University Washington College of Law, the 
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, and the LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM 
who put a lot of time and energy into organizing today’s panel. 
Before we get started with our panelists, I will provide a brief history and 
introduction to the topic.
For the fi rst time ever, in 1986, Congress made it illegal for employers to 
knowingly hire, recruit, or continue to employ undocumented workers through 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, otherwise known as IRCA.2 Since 
1986, controlling illegal immigration by regulating who is entitled to work in 
the United States has been a key component of the U.S. immigration policy. 
For the fi rst time, IRCA required all employers to examine documents to verify 
their employees’ identity and citizenship or immigration status and to attest to 
the verifi cation on the paper-based I-9 form. President Reagan described the 
1. In a 5-3 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
the Court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act—that provides for the suspension and/
or revocation of the business license of Arizona employers who knowingly or intentionally 
employ unauthorized aliens—is not preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and 
Control Act.  Additionally, the Court held that Arizona’s requirement to mandate the usage 
of the E-Verify system preempted federal law.  131 S. Ct. 624 (2011).
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359.
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I-9 provision3 as the keystone of IRCA in 1986.4
Under the paper-based I-9 scheme, the employee offers identity documents, 
such as a driver’s license, and an employment eligibility document, such as 
a social security card. The employer then looks at these documents, and the 
employer is presumed safe if the documents reasonably appear authentic 
on their face. This is the so-called good faith defense. The employer is then 
in the clear unless there is evidence that the employer knowingly hired the 
unauthorized worker. 
In 1994, a unanimous recommendation was made by the bipartisan U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform to institute an electronic employment 
verifi cation system. Our panelist today, Representative Morrison, was on 
that commission. It wasn’t until 1996 that a more mechanized system of 
employment verifi cation was introduced through the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, otherwise known as IIRIRA.5 But, 
even then, the program was only authorized as a pilot program which, after one 
year, became the Basic Pilot Program. 
In 1997, the Basic Pilot Program allowed employers, on a voluntary basis 
and only in fi ve states, to electronically verify the work eligibility of a new 
hire. Congress extended the program to all fi fty states, but it continued on a 
pilot and voluntary basis. Now, in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) changed the name of the Basic Pilot Program to E-Verify, and, the 
same year, the Offi ce of Management and Budget instructed federal agencies 
to utilize the E-Verify system for all new employees. 
E-Verify is an Internet-based system designed as a tool for employers to 
electronically verify employment eligibility. E-Verify is a complement to the 
I-9 paperwork process; it doesn’t replace it. Specifi cally, E-Verify compares 
employee information required by the I-9 form against more than 455 million 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) records, more than 122 million 
Department of State passport records, and more than eighty million [DHS] 
immigration records. So it’s pinging these databases to verify both identity and 
employment eligibility, using the information that was put into the I-9 form 
upon hire. 
3. The I-9 is a paper-based form through which employees record identifi cation 
documents demonstrating employment eligibility.  Employers must examine the 
identifi cation documents and keep records of compliance with the I-9 paper-based, 
employment eligibility verifi cation system.  See Ariz. Contractors. Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 
526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007).
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 624 (2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10-
chamber1208.pdf  (last visited July 28, 2011).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codifi ed in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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 Expanding yet again, beginning September 8, 2009, federal contractors and 
subcontractors became required to participate in E-Verify pursuant to federal 
regulation. 
Then in January 2008, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act,6 
requiring all public and private employers to check the employment eligibility 
of new employees through E-Verify. This Arizona law is the subject of current 
litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case entitled Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting.7 
Now, stepping back and looking at IRCA, Congress developed this as a 
comprehensive scheme to prohibit unauthorized employment. Congress was 
focusing on balancing at least three diffi cult problems: fi rst, minimizing burdens 
on the employer; second, minimizing discrimination against people who are 
permitted to be hired—so this isn’t supposed to be a system that discriminates, 
this is supposed to be a mechanism that eliminates discrimination; and third, it 
is supposed to minimize the hiring of people who are not permitted to be hired. 
The resulting IRCA scheme is a careful and delicate balance. It imposes 
both a fi ne for illegal hiring and a fi ne for discrimination. The Legal Arizona 
Workers Act provides that if an employer hires an unauthorized worker, the 
employer loses its license to do business, instead of merely being fi ned. 
As Justice Breyer noted during the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument 
on June 8, 2010, that scheme amplifi es the incentive to terminate those who 
appear unauthorized to work because it’s actually silent as to the disincentive 
to discriminate. He explains, “If you’re a businessman,  every incentive under 
that law is to call close questions against hiring this person.” In contrast, “[u]
nder the Federal law, every incentive is to look at it carefully [so as not to 
discriminate].”8 
The Legal Arizona Workers Act also requires businesses to use E-Verify, 
and, if they fail to do so, they cannot receive any grants, loans, or performance-
based incentives. As one of our panelists, Dr. Marc Rosenblum, explains in his 
recent report on E-Verify,9 fourteen other states also require certain employees 
in the state to be checked using E-Verify, including four states—Alabama, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah—which similar to Arizona, require all 
employers to participate in E-Verify. 
Mandatory use of E-Verify has been a subject of proposed federal legislation 
for years. In 2005, a bill, passed in the House by a vote of 239 to 182, 
6.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212 (2011). 
7.  Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2010)  (No. 09-115).
8.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 624 (2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10-
chamber1208.pdf  (last visited July 28, 2011).
9. MARC ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS, 
WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2011).
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sought to make employment verifi cation a requirement for all employers.10 
Both major pieces of proposed legislation on comprehensive immigration 
reform in 200611 and 200712 also contained provisions to mandate electronic 
employment verifi cation by employers. In addition to the mandatory use of 
E-Verify, it was also the subject of the [Secure America Through Verifi cation 
and Enforcement Act ] (“SAVE”) Act,13 a bill in the 110th Congress that almost 
garnered the requisite number of signatures for a successful discharge petition 
in the House of Representatives. Finally, in the new Congress, leaders in the
new Republican majority have actively voiced their interest in making E-Verify 
mandatory for all employers. 
It is becoming clear that the expansion or mandatory use of E-Verify is 
potentially on the horizon. Our panelists today will not only help us understand 
the legal battle currently before the Supreme Court in Chamber of Commerce 
v. Whiting, but also help us understand the policy implications of any 
expansion of the use of E-Verify. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting represents 
the possibility that states and even local municipalities may have the ability 
to make E-Verify mandatory for employers in their jurisdiction—creating a 
patchwork of rules nationwide. Some states require E-Verify, whereas other 
states may not. 
Furthermore, statements by Representative Gallegly, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Immigration Panel, and many other Republicans 
as well as many Democrats and Obama Administration offi cials, represent a 
willingness to make E-Verify mandatory. So we’re looking at both what’s 
happening in the Supreme Court and what could happen in the states as well 
as on the federal level. 
First, there is the issue of effectiveness, which our panelists will speak 
of, in catching unauthorized workers. Independent analyses of the E-Verify 
program by the Government Accountability Offi ce and a Maryland research 
group known as Westat shows that if an unauthorized worker presents genuine 
identity and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen, 
E-Verify will erroneously confi rm them as an authorized worker. The report 
estimated, in 2009, that fi fty-four percent of unauthorized workers screened 
through E-Verify were erroneously approved as work authorized. That means 
that E-Verify failed to do the job it is intended to do more than half the time. 
10. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control of 2005, H.R. 
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
11. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
12. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. Secure America Through Verifi cation and Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 3308, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
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Now the supporters of E-Verify will say, “Well, so it’s not perfect. So what? 
At least it does something. At least it catches some of them.” Well, there’s 
another issue that our panelists will discuss, which is the harm it does to 
lawful workers. The mandatory use of E-Verify does not mean employment 
authorization inquiries are only for foreign workers. When it’s mandatory, it’s 
mandatory for all workers. Obviously you can’t decide who’s the worker that 
you’re going to check. It’s a check on all workers.
Thus, a federally commissioned study of E-Verify14 showed that over 
ninety-six percent of workers queried through E-Verify were approved as 
authorized workers. However, while E-Verify’s accuracy rates have increased, 
the [DHS] and Social Security Administration databases, upon which E-Verify 
relies, contain errors. So how do those errors affect U.S. workers? Well, 
for example, workers who naturalize through marriage or have multiple or 
hyphenated surnames may receive erroneous results from E-Verify. When 
problems are found, employers are required, to notify workers of a tentative 
nonconfi rmation, known as a “TNC,” and give the employee an opportunity to 
contest the initial fi nding.
The Westat report fi nds that 0.8 percent of authorized workers were shown 
to be unauthorized. So authorized workers were shown to be unauthorized. 
Another report by Los Angeles County15 showed that error rate to be as high as 
2.7 percent. But let’s say that if it’s made mandatory, even if the error rate were 
only one percent, that would be one percent of 163 million, if we’re looking at 
163 million workers in the United States. Well, 1.6 million authorized workers 
would be unable to work until they could verify their work authorization status. 
More troubling is the incentive to terminate that Justice Breyer mentioned, 
under the Arizona Legal Workers Act. A survey of immigrant workers in 
Arizona found that 33.5 percent of those found tentatively unconfi rmed 
initially through the system, had been unlawfully fi red. They weren’t given 
the chance to correct their tentative nonconfi rmation; to fi x the database; to 
say, “I’ve changed my name since I was married.” And as a result, if we look 
at whether it’s made mandatory with an error rate of one percent of authorized 
workers shown to be unauthorized and if a third are terminated without being 
notifi ed of the tentative nonconfi rmation to contest and seek corrections to 
those databases, we’re looking at over 536,000 work authorized people per 
year who will lose their jobs. You can extrapolate that there will be that type of 
discrimination that authorized workers will lose their jobs.
14. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY® PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20 Report%2012-16-09_2.
pdf (last visited August 18, 2011). 
15. COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES, ANALYSIS:  E-VERIFY 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (2009), http://www.chirla.org/sites/default/fi les/E-Verify.pdf. 
310           THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM        [Vol. 1:3
Third, there’s a fi nancial cost which I will let our guests speak on—for 
example, Bloomberg News Service said that making E-Verify mandatory 
would cost $2.7 billion a year and would also burden businesses.16 There’s the 
issue of prescreening—using E-Verify before someone is even employed—
which raises issues as well, which our guests will speak of. Some businesses 
lack the resources to even use E-Verify.
Then, there’s the elephant in the room. I-9 is a compliance mechanism. 
E-Verify is also a compliance mechanism, but somewhere along the way, it 
became confused with a deportation strategy. Calls for mandatory E-Verify 
tend to portray the program as the solution to our illegal immigration problem 
and a way to generate jobs for unemployed Americans. The elephant in the 
room is that signifi cant portions of the U.S. economy depend on documented, 
immigrant, foreign labor. Not only that, but looking at E-Verify as becoming 
mandatory, individuals are focused on it as the solution to the immigration 
problem without looking at comprehensive immigration reform and 
understanding the needs of our employers. 
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: First of all, thank you all for coming. 
It’s a pleasure to have a chance to talk to people who may get to resolve this 
problem in their professional careers. I’ve been working on it for twenty-fi ve 
years and we’re not there yet, so we probably have plenty to do in this fi eld—if 
you’re interested in it.
I’d like to suggest that it’s very important to put this discussion in a context, 
and the context is, how does the United States operate a successful legal 
immigration regime that has credibility with the American people? I think I’m 
the only person on this panel who has ever actually had to vote on legislation 
generally, and legislation in this area, and so I bring to this discussion the 
perspective of the people who have to be persuaded about what the right thing 
to do is about these diffi cult questions. And I think it’s very important, if you 
believe in immigration as a central part of the American story, that we need to 
fi nd a way to have that be something that has credibility and support among 
Americans. 
And everybody is against illegal immigration. The issue isn’t whether we 
should have a system that is not conforming to law, the challenge is how to 
you actually have a system that operates within legal standards and is not beset 
by the problem we currently have with so many millions of people here on an 
unauthorized basis.
Some people want to use this debate about E-Verify to advance the undoing 
of the mistakes of the past, undoing the fact that there are eleven million people
here illegally and that somehow, there’s some technological fi x that’s going 
to fi x that. I think that’s wrong-headed. What we can do, however, is create a 
16. Jason Arvello, ‘Free’ E-Verify May Cost Small Businesses $2.6 billion: Insight, 
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2011. 
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legally-conforming future, and that’s really what this discussion ought to be 
about—how we do that. 
Now there really is no new policy being debated here. Congress, in 1986, set 
a policy that still appeals to people on an intellectual level of what you have to 
do if you are interested in preventing people from coming to the United States 
in substantial numbers and remaining illegally, whether they entered legally or 
they entered illegally. That is, most people who come here illegally initially or 
who come legally and overstay either, initially have the intention of coming 
here to work or, in order to stay here without legal status, have to work; so that 
employment is at the center of the sustenance of any substantial population of 
people who are unauthorized. 
That’s what Congress decided in 1986, that if there was going to be a 
legal regime—and at that point, we were debating two million, three million, 
whatever number you wanted to accept—with two or three million people 
present in the United States on an unauthorized basis. Obviously, measured 
that way, the 1986 law was a total failure. But the idea at the center of it 
was that this isn’t a border problem—you can only do a certain amount at the 
border—but this is a workplace problem and, if you’re serious about it, you’ve 
got to deal with the workplace.
I don’t think anything’s changed about that policy decision. What we’re 
debating is how to do something at the workplace, and there are no easy and 
simpleminded solutions because, if there were, even with all our political 
problems as a country, we would have done them. We’ve thrown billions of 
dollars at this problem and I don’t know how many trees have been sacrifi ced 
in pursuit of the debate, but we are not much closer to a solution than we were 
in 1986.
So 1986, to me, is the time when we got the policy right and the twenty-fi ve 
years in between is when we’ve gotten the implementation wrong. So, it’s in 
that perspective that I think you should think about this and not get too hung 
up in all the technical arguments without answering this question: how do 
we solve this problem? Because, if we do not have a way to prevent people 
from being employed if they’re unauthorized, then there will be millions of 
unauthorized people here. It’s a simple economic fact. The border will be 
breached in many ways. Many of the people who are here unauthorized came 
legally and then overstayed. It isn’t a problem that’s going to be solved at the 
border. It’s a problem that is either going to be solved at the workplace or not 
at all. 
And that really is the question that people have to struggle with; how much 
burden and on whom are we willing to accept at the workplace, in order to 
prevent the presence of large numbers of unauthorized workers? It is a very 
simple question to state and a very hard question to resolve. And most of 
what you hear in the discussion of all the technicalities of E-Verify tend, 
sometimes, to obscure that fundamental question, because that’s the choice. 
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The other thing I’d say, putting it in context, is there are a lot of people 
in Congress who will feel themselves politically better off for voting for an 
expansion of E-Verify or a mandatory E-Verify without regard to all of the 
niceties that you’ll hear discussed on this panel about fi xing this or fi xing that. 
The political momentum is in favor of enforcement. Billions on the border, 
much of it wasted; billions for the workplace, much of it wasted. The politics 
are pushing away from a rational solution to this problem, a careful solution 
to this problem. The longer this is a debate and not a kind of problem-solving 
implementation, the more likely that we’ll just get all of the downsides and 
miss the upsides, as we did in 1986. 
So, I have just a few other observations. First, I’d like to talk about the 
workplace initiative as a prevention strategy. I think when it’s talked about 
as enforcement, it gets confused about what is the objective. In my opinion, 
the objective is not to use a worksite program to get rid of the eleven million 
people already here. The question of what to do about the eleven million people 
is really a separate policy judgment. I have my opinions on that, but that’s not 
the purpose of this discussion. 
If you see the worksite prevention being confused with fi xing the problem 
that we created over the last twenty-fi ve years, well you’re never going to get 
any agreement on preventing what might happen in the future. And I actually 
think the American people are very open to some reasonable resolution of the 
mistaken eleven million if they can believe that the future is not the creation 
of a new eleven million. So I think it’s very important to think in prevention 
terms. 
If you think in prevention terms, the last thing you would ever do—which 
is something that the Bush and Obama Administrations did—is to go back 
and check existing employees. Because once you go back there, you’ve really 
changed this from a preventing the incentive to come and get a new job into 
some kind of prior enforcement regime, and that was done in the contractor 
regulation. Despite the litigation, which was unsuccessful, the 1986 law forbids 
the use of the current I-9 E-Verify scheme to get at existing employees, but it’s 
the law now for federal contractors.
So prevention is important. Let’s think about how this becomes a 
disincentive to come in the future. No system screening people at the worksite 
will be perfect, number one. And any system will make it more attractive to be 
employed off the books. So there’s two parts to this problem. The one part is 
the compliant employer. Most employers are compliant. They obey laws that 
they don’t agree with everyday. Most employers just follow the law because 
that’s the way to do business. Obviously, publicly-traded corporations are at 
great risk for violating the law, but most business people obey the law; they 
withhold the taxes, they send the taxes in, etc. They may or may not agree 
with it. So there’s a compliant community. And then there’s a noncompliant 
community. We can argue about how big the two of them are, but I think the 
fi rst is much bigger than the second.
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But there is now and there will be, during any enforcement regime, any 
prevention regime, an off-the-books problem. There’s an off-the-books 
problem right now with American citizens, without regard to people who are 
unauthorized to work. If we’re serious about this problem and some other 
problems, we should have a much increased focus on enforcing labor laws 
and insisting on on-the-books employment throughout our economy. We don’t 
even enforce the wages and hours laws effectively right now. 
So that’s a part of this, and anybody who wants any of this to work needs to 
recognize this. The Joint Tax Committee said it would cost seventeen billion 
dollars over ten years if you made E-Verify mandatory, and the reason for that 
number they said was a number of taxpayers would go off the books. Whether 
that number is right or not, it’s directionally correct; that is, you will get more 
of it. Now fi nally, just a few things about E-Verify itself.
My colleague Paul Donnelly, who’s here, and I have been working on 
this going back to the Jordan Commission. He was also a staff member 
of mine when I was in Congress and [assisted with] the 1990 Act. 
So we’re old and gray and rather cranky about the subject. But we found the 
Westat report in plain sight on the DHS website. Nobody was talking about 
it and everybody was talking about false negatives; that is, people who are 
misidentifi ed as unauthorized, which is a number that has been shrinking. But 
what we found really interesting in the Westat report were false positives. The 
fact that, essentially, over half the time, a person who is not authorized could 
be found to be authorized because of impostor documents. And that’s like 
fl ipping a coin. 
So the whole point of this system is not to catch American citizens. The 
whole point of this is to prevent employment of people who are not authorized. 
So, if half the time that group is misidentifi ed, then this system is failing. And 
it won’t succeed unless, in some fashion, the identity of people is actually 
verifi ed, as opposed to numbers that they give or documents they present. I-9 
is a document system. E-Verify is a number and document system. It is easy to 
get impostor documents and an impostor identity and beat this system. When 
the Swift Meatpacking Company was raided, they had about 6,000 employees; 
1,300 of their employees, all of whom had been run through E-Verify, were 
carted off as unauthorized. This is a serious problem, and hiding from this 
problem won’t get us a solution. 
So the impostor problem is very serious and the problems of what it takes to 
verify identity are full of trade-offs between privacy and prevention. And you 
can get into a long discussion about all of those, but I think, at the end of the 
day, we either are going to solve those problems in some way or we’re going 
to give up on it, and then we’re going to have lots of people here unauthorized, 
plain and simple. Some people think if you have enough legal visas, that you’ll 
solve the problem. But the fact is, illegal employment is always cheaper than 
legal employment, so there’ll still be a lot of incentives in the economic system 
if you don’t have any enforcement on the worksite end. 
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Two fi nal things. One, paper raids—which is the new, humane Obama plan 
instead of real raids—actually is the biggest breeder of going out and getting 
impostor documents you could ever imagine. People are being fi red for having 
inadequate documents. Where do you think they go next? To buy impostor 
documents from the black market that provides them. So, this problem is being 
made worse, not better, by paper raids, although they’re more humane, for 
sure. 
And then, fi nally, with respect to how we’re going to get at this problem, 
I think that the scariest thing we might do is to spend billions more dollars 
expanding E-Verify without solving the identity problem and the other trade-
offs that have to be met. But the Supreme Court is going to decide this question 
as to whether the states can go ahead and the states are going ahead, and they 
will continue to go ahead. Now, Arizona was very smart in what it did in this 
piece of legislation. And no other state has actually done exactly what it did. 
Arizona took the 1986 law, which has a very specifi c exemption to preemption 
having to do with business licenses, and they took that language and made that 
the centerpiece of its requirement that E-Verify and other verifi cation be done. 
Whether the Supreme Court will fi nd that it is enough to overcome other 
arguments about preemption or not, I won’t try to guess. But the reason that 
the law passed muster in the Ninth Circuit was because of that very clever 
drafting. And if that’s upheld, then I predict that many states in the country 
will pursue that, and some people have said, “Well, losing a business license is 
capital punishment, so that clearly can’t be compared to a fi ne.” But Congress 
may have opened the door to that by the language employed in 1986, so that’s 
a very interesting question to watch. But the people who drafted this were not 
stupid. They knew exactly the channel they were trying to drive through. 
PETER ASAAD: Now we turn to Dr. Marc Rosenblum. 
DR. ROSENBLUM: Well, thank you for coming, everybody and including 
me on this prestigious panel. It’s a tough act to follow and an honor to follow 
Congressman Morrison. But I’ll reiterate a couple of points and maybe expand 
on a couple of points. I’ll also tell you that I brought copies of my recent 
E-Verify report and it’s back on the back table, so please pick that up.
Let me fi rst, to reiterate, tell you that this program has been around since 
1997. It’s really only been in use since 2005. In 2005, there were still just 
5,000 employers using the system. But it’s grown exponentially, as in literally 
exponentially; it’s doubled every year since 2005. And currently, there are 
200,000 participating employers, which is about four percent of all employers 
in the country, and about fourteen million verifi cations were run last year, 
which is about a quarter of all hires in a typical year.
So that exponential growth means that most of what we know about 
E-Verify is based on very recent experience, and we don’t still know exactly 
how the system works, partly because most of this growth has occurred during 
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the recent economic downturn. So, we still have a lot to learn as this program 
continues to expand in terms of how it affects labor markets and hiring. And 
certainly, we don’t know how it would work in the context of a different 
immigration system that did a better job with matching supply and demand. 
Although, certainly there’s no perfect way to do that, and you’ll always have 
compliant employers and non-compliant employers. 
But, I agree that it’s very important as we think about how to make E-Verify 
work and how to put it in the context of the broader immigration debate, 
to have in mind these two different populations of employers; the majority 
of employers who intend to comply and then a subset of employers who 
knowingly—or at least suspect that they’re hiring unauthorized workers. And, 
there are employers now who do that in the I-9 context, and there are employers 
in mandatory E-Verify states who knowingly, or more or less knowingly, hire 
unauthorized workers because they feel unable to fi nd U.S. workers or because 
they prefer to hire unauthorized workers since they can pay them less for a 
variety of reasons. 
Designing a system that makes it easy for willingly-compliant employers 
to comply accurately is a different task than designing a system to prevent 
willfully-noncompliant employers from fi nding a way around the system. And 
clever employers, with offi ce workers who are looking for employment, have 
a lot of resources to look for ways around the system. So it’s really different 
tasks going after those two different problems.
 I believe that E-Verify is a very powerful and important tool to build on the 
I-9 process and to address what we know is the big fl aw in the I-9 system, which 
is that the I-9 system is a document-based system and it is very vulnerable to 
document fraud. The employer has the responsibility to look and see if identity 
documents on their face are genuine and prove work eligibility. Anybody can 
go down to the fl ea market and buy a fake ID that looks genuine on its face, 
so E-Verify was designed to prevent a certain type of fake ID by making sure 
that the name and the number on the ID match data in DHS and Social Security 
databases. 
Looking at the data that DHS has made available, E-Verify probably 
prevented about 166,000, unauthorized workers from obtaining employment 
in 2009 by successfully non-confi rming fake IDs. But there are two different 
vulnerabilities. One is that while E-Verify can identify fake IDs that don’t have 
a genuine name and number on them, it’s vulnerable to identity fraud when an 
unauthorized worker uses a borrowed ID or a stolen ID or a fake ID that has a 
real name and number on it that are available on the black market.
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The system has almost no mechanism designed to prevent this. There are a 
couple of tools that USCIS17 has been experimenting with to try to cut down 
on identity fraud, but for the most part, there is no defense against it right now 
in E-Verify. The one defense that exists on a small scale is that for certain 
types of IDs, USCIS has a photo-matching tool, which means that if you use 
a green card or a passport or an employment authorization document as your 
identity document and you’re using E-Verify, then the employer, in addition 
to getting the confi rmation that the name and number are in the database, will 
also get a copy of the picture that’s on the original ID that was issued and the 
employer can then match that picture to the ID that they’re presented with and 
make sure that it’s not a fake ID with a real number on it and somebody else’s 
picture. But only about two percent of hiring uses those documents. Most 
hiring uses driver’s licenses to prove identity. So the identity fraud issue is 
one vulnerability and the off-the-books employment is the other vulnerability. 
With employers who intend to comply, they are vulnerable to being victims 
of the identity fraud problem. And so what that means is that employers who 
use E-Verify and are doing their best have no guarantee that they have a legal 
workforce. And that’s a major disincentive to employers to take on the hassle 
of using E-Verify because, even if you do everything right, you may not have 
a legal workforce. And so employers really don’t get anything out of using 
E-Verify. They don’t get a legal safe harbor and if [Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement]18 does an audit, they may lose their whole workforce. So there’s 
really nothing in it for employers right now.
The off-the-books problem and the identity fraud problem is also an issue 
for willfully-noncompliant employers because employers can conspire with 
workers to use identity fraud in a variety of ways and they can just either 
employ their workers off the books or use E-Verify selectively for some 
workers and not others or just not use E-Verify even though they’re required 
to do so. 
17.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the government agency 




18.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the principal investigative 
arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  See ICE Overview, ICE, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/. 
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As it has been pointed out, [the Congressional Budget Offi ce]19 estimates 
that requiring all employers to use E-Verify without creating an opportunity to 
legalize their workforce would result in seventeen billion dollars in lost taxes 
over ten years as a result of existing workers being moved off the books or 
workers who would be hired on the books being hired off the books instead. 
There are limits to E-Verify’s ability to do its job. The other point that Peter 
referred to is that the system also sometimes non-confi rms legal workers, and 
we estimate that happens about one percent of the time; being 0.8 and 2.0 
percent of the time—depending on what survey you look at. If all employers 
were required to screen all new hires, that would be about between 600,000 
and 1.2 million workers a year, legal workers who would be wrongly non-
confi rmed. And between 60,000 and 280,000 workers would lose their jobs or 
lose some period of employment or somehow face adverse consequences from 
their employer during that period. 
But the other issue with those false non-confi rmations is that it creates a 
lot of uncertainty for employers during the hiring process. In that one to two 
percent of the time, employers by law have to treat all non-confi rmations as 
tentative non-confi rmations and keep workers on the books, treating them as 
if they were legal workers until workers are given the opportunity to correct 
those errors. That raises the cost of using the system for employers because 
most of the time, those workers end up being non-confi rmed. 
Therefore, to be compliant, employers have to keep workers on their 
payrolls and train them even though they end up getting non-confi rmed.
So, it increases the cost of using the system pretty signifi cantly in those 
cases of non-confi rmation. And even though most U.S. workers, most 
legal workers, are immediately confi rmed, about a quarter of the time that 
people are non-confi rmed, those are mistakes. So, it’s a signifi cant number 
and would be a much more signifi cant number in a universal system. 
 As we think about expanding E-Verify, let me just make a couple of points. 
One is that all of the problems that exist—identity fraud, identity theft, workers 
having adverse consequences—all these problems will not only increase 
absolutely as the system gets bigger but also proportionally, and the reason is 
that, in a mostly voluntary system like we have now, most E-Verify users are 
federal contractors and/or large fi rms. 
Nationwide, about ninety percent of employers are small fi rms with fewer 
than twenty employees; only about thirty percent of E-Verify users have fewer 
than twenty employees. So, almost all of the growth that we have ahead of us is 
among small fi rms who have less internet access [and] smaller [human resource 
(“HR”)] departments. Using E-Verify and using it correctly is a much larger
19.  The Congressional Budget Offi ce (“CBO”) is charged with providing nonpartisan 
analyses to aid in federal budget decision-making and the Congressional budget process. 
See About CBO, CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/.   
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expense for these small fi rms than it is for large fi rms with HR departments 
who still struggle to use it correctly. So it’s quite likely that existing error rates 
and existing noncompliance rates will increase as a different demographic of 
employers are required to use the system. That’s one point. 
A second point I want to make is that the photo-matching tool that USCIS 
uses and the other major innovation that USCIS has implemented in the last 
few years, which is its own sort of electronic auditing of employers to look 
for cases of employer misuse and to look for identity fraud, have limited 
ability to address these weaknesses in the system and misuse by employers 
through electronic monitoring and through existing photo-matching tools. And 
basically, the reason is that most off-the-books employment and most identity 
fraud don’t show up through long-distance electronic auditing. There’s no sort 
of footprint in the electronic record that shows if you’re selectively screening 
your workers. We don’t have that sophisticated of an electronic monitoring 
tool.
It goes very much to the point that [Congressman] Morrison raised of who 
is going to bear the costs of making this system work. Because, anything that 
we do to prevent false confi rmations, to make sure that the system does a better 
job of preventing unauthorized employment, must create additional costs for 
employers, and, especially, must create additional costs for legal workers. And 
the likeliest tool, or one of the tools that we might think about to do that is to 
create a biometric system. A biometric system would be much less vulnerable 
to identity fraud, but the way we would—the steps we’d have to take to create 
a biometric system—include all U.S. citizens and all legal workers would have 
to give their biometrics to the government to create a biometric database that 
could check against and all employers would have to capture biometrics when 
they hire somebody. So, they’d have to have fi ngerprint-scanning technology 
at the worksites or use subcontractors who are going to do that scanning, which 
raises liability issues.
But, in any event, this is a major expansion beyond what E-Verify does now. 
But those are the kinds of who bears the costs of fi xing the system questions 
that we have to raise as we think about, especially if we think about using this 
as an enforcement tool rather than sort of a compliance tool. 
So let me just fi nally mention that having raised this issue of biometrics and 
the costs associated with biometrics, I also want to put in a pitch for a couple 
of pilot programs that USCIS is initiating that I think should be explored as 
alternatives to biometrics and as alternative strategies for strengthening this 
system. And one of them is further expansion of the photo-matching tool to 
include state drivers licenses. To do that likely would require congressional 
action to mandate that states participate, and the debate over the Real ID Act20 
has shown how diffi cult that is. But that would be a powerful tool to help 
20.  REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). 
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employers who want to comply do so successfully. It’s not going to do anything 
against the intentionally noncompliant employers but a powerful potential tool 
for employers who intend to comply. 
And then the other tool that I think is quite important is a self-check tool 
which would allow workers to check their own E-Verify records and to 
confi rm themselves in the system before they go to get employment. This 
is an important tool because it should—for workers who use this—greatly 
reduce false non-confi rmations and employer misuse of the system or the 
consequences of employer misuse of the system. But it’s also potentially a 
powerful anti-fraud tool because, although this is not how USCIS is piloting it
initially, in principle, it creates the opportunity for workers to lock their own 
social security numbers and to prevent people from using their number without 
their knowledge. So I think it’s potentially a way to substantially reduce fraud 
without having to resort to biometrics, which may be desirable both from a 
cost perspective and from privacy and civil liberties perspectives. 
PETER ASAAD: Miss Tulli, your organization has produced several reports 
highlighting many of the concerns raised in our panel discussion today. And 
to prevent reiteration of that same discussion, I wanted to ask more about a 
report that your organization produced, about how errors in E-Verify databases 
impact U.S. citizens and lawfully-present immigrants. There are cases cited 
where authorized workers, lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens, had 
diffi culty clarifying denials of work authorization under E-Verify. Can you 
discuss with us some of these cases you and others have seen at [the National 
Immigration Law Center (“NILC”)]21 and how they were handled? Can you 
walk us through the path to the resolution where they ultimately resolved? 
How long did it take? What was the cost to the employers?
EMILY TULLI: As Peter mentioned, at NILC we have a policy advocacy 
wing but we also provide technical assistance to worker advocates and workers 
who are going through a variety of immigrant and workplace-related issues 
and specifi cally with E-Verify. 
I think it may be useful to ground our discussion today a little bit in a real 
worker’s saga. So, I’m just going to talk a little bit about Jessica. She was 
born and raised in Florida, and she took a job at a major telecommunications 
company in Florida [during the] fall of this year. And as we think through her 
story, I think it’s useful to consider—as the panelists have set up for us—if 
E-Verify was to become mandatory and all workers were input into this system.
So, as we all do, she began employment there; she fi lled out typical I-9 
paperwork, and her employer ran her through E-Verify. She wasn’t aware of 
what she was being run through. They ran her through the system—that’s what 
21.  About Us, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/nilcinfo/index.
htm (last visited July 28, 2011).
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they told her. And, after a day of work, they came back to her and said, “You’re 
showing up as not authorized to work. You need to go and resolve this.” And 
she was confused—[she was] born and raised in Florida. 
So, as a fi rst step, she went home, and she got some more vital documents, 
identity documents, and brought them back to her employer to try and resolve it. 
Well, that didn’t work so the employer issued her a tentative nonconfi rmation, 
as they’re supposed to under the program rules, and she went to her local 
Social Security offi ce to try and resolve the issue. 
Now, when she went to her local Social Security offi ce—and remember, 
she’s taking unpaid time, at this point, so she’s not working; she’s an hourly, 
low-wage worker. [The Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] is open in her 
area between 9:00 [a.m.] and 4:00 [p.m.], so she had to go during those hours. 
And Social Security inputs her information and says, “You’re fi ne. We can see 
here that you’re work authorized. Go back to your employer. They’ve made a 
mistake.” So she’s now excited. She goes back to her employer, being told by 
the SSA that she’s work authorized, which she knew, and the employer tells 
her, “Nope, you’re still not coming up in our system;” again, not specifying the 
system, not giving her any information.
At this point, she’s beside herself. She’s frantic. She had been unemployed 
before she got this job. So she decides to start Googling and she calls legal 
services organizations in Florida. After talking to an attorney at a legal services 
organization, they sent her to the regional [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)] offi ce. So everybody here knows that EEOC is most 
likely not going to have jurisdiction over E-Verify issues in this sense. But she 
very dutifully goes to the EEOC offi ce to try and resolve the complaint and at 
this point she’s been issued that [f that people are talking about. So as she’s 
trying to resolve it, she couldn’t resolve it within the seven days; now she has 
that fi nal nonconfi rmation, she’s been terminated. 
At the EEOC, they listened very patiently and told her, “Well, you don’t 
have a discrimination claim but maybe you should call E-Verify.” This is the 
fi rst time this worker who has been fi red has heard the word E-Verify and 
knows anything about it. It’s from the EEOC, which doesn’t have jurisdiction 
over her claim.
So she went online and she called a USCIS hotline number. Again, she called 
that hotline number between 9:00 [a.m.] and 5:00 [p.m.] because that’s when 
they’re available and, luckily, she speaks English. At this point, the hotline 
is only available in English and Spanish, so if she spoke another language 
it would be diffi cult to get some help. She waits on the line for over an hour 
and then fi nally talks to a representative and what do they tell her? “Well, 
you’re in our system fi ne. You’re work authorized. Go back to your employer, 
who you’ve now been terminated from, and just tell them that you’re work 
authorized. We can see here that you’re work authorized.” 
So she says, “OK, great. This is exciting. USCIS is telling me that they have 
me in their system. This is going to be fi xed. Can you send me a piece of paper 
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indicating that, that I can then take to my employer?” “No, we can’t do that.” 
Though USCIS does offer to call the employer. And USCIS calls her employer 
and tries to work it out. 
Now in this interim, it took about a week of USCIS talking to her employer; 
her following up with the employer and the employer still saying, “We can’t 
fi gure out what the problem is. We know USCIS is calling us. We understand. 
We can’t fi gure out what the problem is.” In the interim of this period, when 
she’s not hearing back, she starts job searching. And I probably didn’t do a 
great job laying out the timeline but she was unemployed from the time she 
received the FNC and was terminated until she found another position, not at 
this employer. She was unemployed for three months. She decides that she’s 
just not going to go back to the employer. Whether they can fi gure it out with 
USCIS or not, she doesn’t want to go back because they use E-Verify and she 
doesn’t want to have to go through that again. So at that point, she’s now taken 
another position. The USCIS and her original employer, the telecommunications 
company, have fi gured out what the problem was and now they’re willing to 
take her on now that she’s gotten another position which, of course, is for 
two dollars less an hour. I think that is a really sort of compelling narrative 
and I think what’s important to underscore is that Jessica, who I’ve talked to 
numerous times, is actually incredibly capable. She’s young, she’s Internet 
savvy, she is culturally competent. She’s not a work-authorized immigrant 
worker; she was born in this country, so she has some understanding of how 
U.S. government works. She has a family who supported her. So for her, three 
months without employment didn’t mean an eviction, utilities off, all those 
other things that come with the reality of working in a low-wage industry; but 
instead, she had a family that could support her, provide her with a space to 
live.
JON FEERE: What was the error?
EMILY TULLI: The error was actually on the employer’s part. [She had] 
a two-part last name and they were putting two spaces instead of one space 
between the name, and that caused the non-confi rmation.
JON FEERE: And that was an employer who tried to do everything right 
and help the worker, and that’s the other thing that doesn’t always work right.
EMILY TULLI: Yes. 
PETER ASAAD: And this is a story about a non-savvy, if you will, 
employee who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of the system. But there’s 
also the story of Traci Hong, who is—who’s been on the House Immigration 
Subcommittee for several years. And when she was fi rst hired, there was a 
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requirement of all federal government employees to go through E-Verify. Well, 
she certainly knows the ins and outs more than just about any of us, but there 
was a mismatch. I’m sure Marc knows a little bit more about this. There was a 
mismatch in her case and it took her quite some time and quite some diffi culty 
to go through that system and fi x the database error.
But I just want to proceed a little bit to Mr. Feere. Your organization, the 
Center for Immigration Studies,22 has produced reports showing the benefi ts 
of E-Verify and it’s really important to understand those arguments. Would 
you provide us some of those conclusions; why your organization has reached 
those conclusions?
JON FEERE: Alright. Well, fi rst off, let me just say I might be the only 
panelist up here who can say that my organization uses E-Verify. I don’t 
know if any of you guys do, but we do. We’re a small nonprofi t and, like all 
nonprofi ts, we’re always pinching pennies to make sure that we can maintain 
our staff. And despite what some opponents of E-Verify say, it hasn’t been 
some sort of fi nancial disaster. We aren’t closing up shop because of E-Verify. 
It’s very straightforward, our manager has no problem with it, and it’s working 
to make sure that anyone who’s in our offi ce is legally employable. 
Couple of things I wanted to mention as far as statistics go. Right now, about 
a thousand businesses sign up for it every week, some willingly, some because 
they’re in a state that requires it. And from the research we can see, it means that 
over one out of every four new hires actually is run through E-Verify. Ninety-
nine percent of eligible workers are confi rmed to work instantaneously; three 
to fi ve seconds you get a response back. Fewer than one percent of eligible 
workers need to update their records to be confi rmed. Certainly there are still 
some errors in the system. As you mentioned before, if you had changed your 
last name or if the employer screwed up, then certainly it has to be corrected. 
But for the most part, things are correct. We just heard the example of the 
staffer; she was able to correct it.
Now we do view this as part of the solution to illegal immigration, as did the 
commissions in the [19]90’s. And if we go back to 1986, when we had the fi rst 
large-scale, comprehensive amnesty bill, the bill was sold as a two-part deal; 
it was legalization for those were here illegally and it was also the promise of 
future enforcement of immigration laws. It also, as we heard, criminalized the 
hiring of illegal immigrants.
22. About CIS, THE CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, http://www.cis.org/About (last 
visited July 28, 2011).  
2011]            E-VERIFY: CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING               323 
Well it wasn’t until a decade or so later that we fi nally were provided some 
opportunity to determine whether or not their employees—or their potential 
employees—were legally authorized to work and that was what eventually 
became the E-Verify system. And what concerns us is that here we are now, 
twenty-fi ve years later—a quarter of a century out from the 1986 amnesty—
and we’re still seeing a lot of effort by those who supported the amnesty to try 
and stop the growth of any type of workplace verifi cation system. 
And I think Americans are concerned about that as well. I think people, by 
and large, distrust the federal government’s willingness to enforce immigration
laws and the idea—I’ve heard it mentioned kind of subtly a couple of times 
here that we need another pathway to citizenship for employees who are here 
legally. But what would that do? What would that solve? We already know that 
if you were to legalize illegal immigrants with promises of future enforcement 
or promises of some new type of verifi cation program, it’s going to be another 
twenty-fi ve years or so before it ever gets enforced and during that time, 
there will be lawsuits to try and prevent it. Some of the groups that have fi led 
lawsuits against using E-Verify are groups that, years ago, supposedly were in 
favor of making sure there was workplace compliance. 
So the idea, for us, is that mass legalization, as the Congressman said, was 
a failure. We tried it in [19]86. If the goal was to reduce illegal immigration, 
clearly it didn’t work. People are suggesting we try it again. It’s not going to 
work without enforcement. The other option that we often hear from advocates 
of mass legalization is that if we don’t do that, the only other option is mass 
deportation. And of course, no one’s calling for mass deportation either. 
And that’s why we think the middle ground is the policy of attrition, where 
you slowly shrink the illegal immigrant population over time by sending the 
message that if you come legally, we’ll help you out. In fact, there should 
be a warmer welcome for those who are admitted legally. But if you are not 
coming here through proper channels, we’re not going to accommodate you 
as easily. You’ll not be able to fi nd a job. And that’s really what we’re talking 
about, is the jobs magnet; that’s what encourages illegal immigration. And the 
way you turn off that magnet is by requiring businesses to use programs like 
E-Verify. Is it 100 percent perfect? Of course not. There aren’t any government 
programs that are 100 percent perfect. Is it ready for prime time? I don’t think 
the government necessarily thinks it is but we’re certainly getting there. And 
as was mentioned, there is the policy of adding photo IDs to E-Verify, which 
would reduce the fraud rates that much more. You should know that about 
ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants use a social security number—a 
fake ID with their name but a fake number. And E-Verify can catch that very 
easily because they’re going to match the name and the number and realize, 
“Well, there’s no match here,” or the number is not even legitimate. And that’s 
ninety-eight percent of the problem; ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants 
do that. The remainder, of course, are using black market IDs which are very 
expensive and very diffi cult to come across. And for that, the photo ID process, 
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if it is attached and if there’s support for it, could certainly rule that out. 
But as far as the fallout goes from not doing anything, I mean there’s a very 
high cost to cheap labor that I think people tend to forget. We’re talking about 
exploitation here. We’re talking about child labor; young kids being worked 
many hours at a lot of these meatpacking plants, for example, that were the 
focus of ICE raids that we heard about earlier. You can put an end to this if 
there’s a serious commitment to workplace enforcement. And so far, I just 
don’t think that there is. And I haven’t heard much in the way of solutions 
rather than additional legalization programs. 
Let me give you one quick example here and I’m going to close. There’s 
a company that was the focus of an ICE raid in 2006. It was a meatpacking 
company, Swift & Company. We found—this is well-known—that there were 
1,300 illegal immigrants who were found to have been working at six different 
meat processing plants. I’m not certain if all of them were E-Verify. I know 
there’s some claims that they were. We do know that the business owners were 
instructing the employees on how to get around the system, where to buy fake 
IDs. The business wasn’t trying to uphold the law.
About twenty-three percent of Swift’s production workers were illegal 
immigrants. Now government data—and this is just so troubling to me— 
government data shows that the average wages of meatpackers in 2007 were 
forty-fi ve percent lower than what they were in 1980, and that’s adjusting for 
infl ation.23 That’s a signifi cant problem and it’s the result of not just porous 
borders but a lack of enforcement at the workplace.
Well guess what. After the raid occurred, after the illegal immigrants were 
removed from the jobs, people lined up around the corners to take those jobs. 
And in fact, we found—or our Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who works 
for us found—that wages and bonuses rose, on average, eight percent with the 
departure of illegal immigrants. I think that’s a good thing. I don’t know who 
can say that it’s not a good thing. 
I’ll leave it there.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much, Jon Feere, for that perspective as 
well. Now Mr. Hampe, you’re a partner of Baker & McKenzie. You represent 
clients. You’ve also worked on legislative efforts and you understand the 
dynamic of how clients such as the Chamber of Commerce represents many 
clients that are against E-Verify and we were talking a little bit about solutions 
to the whole problem. How do you see E-Verify? Is it a solution, a solution to 
what? Can you put that in your perspective as far as representing clients and 
understanding legislation as well? 
23. Jerry Kammer, The 2006 Swift Raids: Assessing the Impact of Immigration 
Enforcement Actions at Six Facilities (Mar. 2009), http://www.cis.org/2006SwiftRaids.
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CARL HAMPE: Sure. I think the question properly focuses on the point 
Bruce Morrison made at the start, which is if you’re serious about having an 
immigration system with robust legal immigration numbers that the American 
public can support—which there’s sort of mixed support for at the moment—
then you simply do have to address the problem of unauthorized employment. 
It’s just a given. So if one is to conclude, as Congress did in 1986, that employers 
are the entry point and the incentive, that U.S. employment is the incentive
for people to come here without authorization, in most instances, then what 
should employers do; how much should the burden be on employers? And I 
think employers have responded by saying, in most instances, they are willing 
to take reasonable measures, as long as they are effective. And that’s kind of 
the rub.
You will fi nd a diversity of opinion among employers. The Chamber 
has opposed the Arizona statute. I think they wouldn’t oppose it under all 
circumstances. They’re certainly willing, I understand, to discuss a federal 
statute that preempts a patchwork of state statutes and says “Here is the rule,” 
as long as the system in place was effective. And I think when you talk about 
the large companies that I counsel, that’s really the key. Employers want to 
minimize risk in all aspects of what they do so they can go about doing what 
they do, which is providing goods, services, and attempting to make a profi t. 
Immigration is a risk factor to the extent the proposals, such as E-Verify, can 
reduce the risk involved in the hiring and employment process; then they’re 
positive, as long as the requirements are economically rational.
E-Verify is, to some employers, too much, and to some employers, too little 
and it kind of depends on where you sit. Small employers who may rely on, 
shall we say, sketchy pools of labor, would probably be uneasy about having 
E-Verify required of them. Large employers, particularly those with large 
numbers of unskilled workers and especially those that are publicly traded, 
have long ago crossed that threshold. They do E-Verify. That’s not going to 
change. They read the ICE best practices. They do as many of the additional 
best practices that ICE suggests would be undertaken by a compliant employer. 
And they are constantly looking for a way to reduce their immigration risk. 
Obviously, if you’re a meatpacker or a chicken processor, you’re at very high 
risk and so you undertake most, if not all, of the ICE best practices and you 
attempt to do it in a way that is compliant with all laws, including the anti-
discrimination laws. 
So employers are looking for practical solutions. E-Verify is here to stay 
without question and, at the same time, it doesn’t resolve enough of the risks 
that employers see on all sides of the aisle. Employers don’t want to be raided 
by ICE, they don’t want to unfairly deny employment to someone who’s 
authorized, they don’t want to be the subject of anti-discrimination suits; they 
simply want to go about doing their business. And the immigration system, at 
the moment, at the new employment transaction point and thereafter, simply 
isn’t suffi cient. 
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And the debate, the healthy diversity of opinion you’re seeing on this panel 
merely indicates how challenging it is for the politicians and policymakers, 
to come up with the systems that would make the risk that employers face 
in the employment transaction go down. I think employers would like to see 
legislation that worked but, of course, that’s the question: can it happen. 
PETER ASAAD: Appreciate the perspective very much of the employer. 
Now sliding over to Professor Vladeck, you’re a professor who understands 
federal jurisdiction and constitutional law. If you would, what you think will 
happen in the Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting case. Now the District Court 
sided with the Arizona workers; so did the Ninth Circuit. And there have been 
oral arguments and there’ve been some comments based on the oral argument 
questioning from the justices. Where do you see it going and what do you see 
the consequences being? 
PROFESSOR VLADECK: Well, I guess I should preface it by saying 
I hate guessing how the Supreme Court is going to rule because I’m either 
wrong or I’m right for the wrong reasons. No one actually knows.
That being said, I think one can read your argument here, I think somewhat 
reliably, to suggest that the Court’s inclined to affi rm the Ninth Circuit and to 
thereby hold that IRCA does not preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act, but 
Arizona mandating E-Verify actually is permissible. 
What I think is going to be interesting is not what the result is, but how the 
Court writes that opinion. Because I think there are a couple of different ways 
they can go and how they do it will have, I think, far greater consequences than 
[merely just affi rming].
So let me just sort of briefl y elaborate and then throw it back to some of you. 
The only legal question is what IRCA means when it exempts state laws related 
to licensing or other similar laws from its expressed preemption provision. So 
this is not, for example, like the SB 1070 case24 where the preemption is based 
on a sort of more general, and less textual, confl ict between state and federal 
law. Here you actually have a case of expressed preemption or not, depending 
upon whether the Legal Arizona Workers Act is, or is not, a licensing law. And 
indeed, most of the oral argument was about that very question: is it a licensing 
law. 
And what the Justices really struggled with was the notion that they could 
really tell Arizona that by saying, “We will revoke business licenses if you fail 
to comply with E-Verify,” that that somehow wasn’t a licensing law. It may be
a sort of troubling licensing law, it may be a licensing law that we might not 
have enacted, but it’s about licenses. 
Now the argument that Carter Phillips made on behalf of the Chamber of 
24. S.B. 1070, 49th Legis., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
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Commerce is that licensing law means, more specifi cally, laws that go to the 
conferral on a license and not just the revocation of a license. I don’t think it 
strains credulity to suggest that that’s a thin reed on which to rest this entire 
case, and I think some of the Justices’ questions went in that direction.
So I think one way out is for the Court to just hold narrowly that, because 
the Arizona law specifi cally imputes, as the sanction, that a business license 
is revoked—clearly a licensing law within the meaning of 1324a(h)(2)25—we 
don’t have to decide anything else. 
What’s really interesting, though, is throughout the oral argument, on both 
sides—well, three sides because the federal government argued, too—Justice 
Scalia kept coming back to this notion that the rules might be different when 
you have federal policy that is underenforced by the executive branch. And I 
have to say, I can’t think he means it. And the reason why is because if you 
guys remember [ ], it was Justice Scalia writing for the Supreme Court who 
basically said, “Article II of the Constitution protects the executive’s discretion 
to enforce federal law.” And so, just as Congress cannot command how the 
president exercises his discretion, nor can Congress make an end run around 
that by enlisting the states in requiring the enforcement of certain federal laws.
If that logic makes any sense, then it should also hold for states; that 
states cannot tie the hands of the federal Executive. In other words, under-
enforcement, although problematic as a policy matter, has no actual bearing on 
the constitutional analysis; it has no actual bearing on the preemption analysis. 
I think that has to be right. And so that’s why I think we’re likely to see an 
opinion that sort of ducks the underenforcement question, saves it for SB 1070 
and really just sort of construes the statute as narrowly as possible because 
Arizona did, really, what so few of the states have done, which is—at least in 
this statute’s context—rely specifi cally on the licensing concept. 
If that’s what the Court holds, and I think it is, it’ll be overnight that I think 
we’ll see more and more states moving toward imposing certain kinds of 
sanctions on employers in the guise of licensing practices. And I think the 
question is going to be whether the Supreme Court says the sanction has to 
be in some way related to the ability of the business to function, which I think 
would still get you the Arizona law but which would not get you anything 
about immigration in the guise of business licenses.
So I think that’s where we’ll see how it cashes out. But if I were a betting 
man, I think it’s likely that the Arizona law is going to be upheld.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much. So it seems, Congressman Morrison, 
was onto something when he actually said that it was well-crafted and well-
written. And Professor Vladeck, who says, “Let’s look at how it’s written. 
Let’s look at how the whole thing is going to be written, how narrow will it 
be.” But we could end up then, in fact, with a template, if you will, for other 
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (making employment of unauthorized noncitizens 
unlawful).
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states and localities to pass successful legislation. 
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: And indeed, that may in itself provide it 
if it’s just [for Congress to revisit the issue].
CARL HAMPE: Yes. Actually, I was just going to say that. Bruce, maybe 
you’d agree that if the Supreme Court said, “OK, the Arizona statute is fi ne,” 
ten other states rush to present those bills to their legislatures, that might 
bring the Chamber and other groups aligned with them back to the Hill to say, 
“Alright, let’s preempt this once and for all,” and then the question would be, 
“OK, under what standards?” Because that kind of opens up the whole basis 
upon which one has an E-Verify program.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: That would seem to make sense but I 
spent four years making that argument on behalf of the Society for Human 
Resources Management that this—I mean I said then, and it proved out, that 
the Arizona law was going to be upheld because of the narrow tailoring of the 
language. Nobody wanted to hear it at the time. Now I guess it’s conventional 
wisdom. 
But the fact is that NumbersUSA—to take one organization, for instance 
—actually has built its grassroots base on advocating state laws and they’re 
going to get a big boost out of this case if it goes the way Professor Vladeck 
suggests and they’re going to do a lot of organizing, they’re going to get a lot 
of members off of it. And it’s not entirely clear that the Republican majority 
in the House will want to fi x the problem once the states have the authority 
to “fi x the problem.” Because the state solution seems to be much easier to 
achieve than the federal one and doesn’t come with any legalization baggage, 
for instance. So it might play out quite the other way from what Carl suggests. 
PROFESSOR VLADECK: It doesn’t come with legalization baggage. It 
does come with litigation baggage. Because I think the real issue is the Arizona 
law is about as close to a pure licensing requirement as I think you could get 
without the added piece of actually being necessary to obtain a license versus
revoking a license. The question is going to be, when states start going further 
afi eld . . . 
PETER ASAAD: Alright, thank you so much to our panelists for all their 
time. And thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT
